

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

S E C R E T STATE 027235

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OGEN, (ASSISTANT SECRETARY INGERSOLL)

SUBJECT: WEEKLY ROUND-UP ON EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY INGERSOLL

1. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN  
THE EA AREA DURING THE PAST WEEK.

2. (ENERGY AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMY.

EARLIER GLOOMY PROSPECTS FOR THE JAPANESE ECONOMY ARE BEING  
DISPELLED NOW THAT OIL IMPORTS HAVE RISEN. DESPITE PRO-  
DUCTION CUTS JAPAN HAS GOTTEN MORE OIL IN THE LAST TWO  
MONTHS THAN IN THE SAME MONTHS A YEAR AGO; AND PRODUCTION  
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LEVELS HAVE RISEN IN MOST AREAS. REAL GNP GROWTH IN 1974  
IS NOW EXPECTED TO BE ABOUT 5 PERCENT, FAR BETTER THAN THE  
MINUS 5 PERCENT PREDICTED BY ONE MINISTRY LAST DECEMBER.

3. GROWTH WILL BE LIMITED BY FACTORS OTHER THAN THE PETROLEUM SITUATION. SEVERAL RAW MATERIALS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY, LITTLE EXCESS PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY IS AVAILABLE, AND NEW INVESTMENT IN PLANT AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE RESTRICTED BY TIGHT CREDIT. ONE HELPFUL SIGN IS THAT PRICES OF SOME BASIC COMMODITIES SUCH AS STEEL, CHEMICALS AND PAPER ARE EASING. THIS COULD MEAN THAT CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION RATES WILL BEGIN TO DROP SOON. PRIME MINISTER TANAKA HAS

TACKLED THE INFLATION PROBLEM ANOTHER WAY BY ENGAGING IN JAWBONING TACTICS. ON FEBRUARY 4 HE CALLED IN 85 TOP BUSINESS LEADERS AND ASKED THEM TO ABSTAIN FROM INCREASING PRICES OF CONSUMER GOODS AND STOP HOARDING SUPPLIES. IF IT WORKS, TANAKA'S ACTION WILL BE A POLITICAL PLUS FOR HIM IN AN AREA WHERE HIS RECORD WAS NOT GOOD IN 1973.

#### 4. SAUDI-JAPAN NEGOTIATIONS ON INDUSTRIALIZATION.

A REPORT FROM EMBASSY JIDDA ADDS USEFUL INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF SAUDI-JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE CONTINUED AT VARIOUS LEVELS FOR YEARS, BUT NOW ARE MOVING AHEAD MUCH MORE SERIOUSLY. IN DESCRIBING SOME OF THE PLAN THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AT JIDDA SAID THAT JAPANESE INDUSTRY, NOT GOVERNMENT, IS EXPECTED TO TAKE THE LEAD.

5. VARIETY OF PROPOSALS ARE BEING EXAMINED. PETROCHEMICALS, WHICH ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY, ARE AT THE HEAD OF THE LIST OF PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS. TWO DIFFERENT PROPOSALS FOR STEEL FABRICATION ARE UNDER STUDY, AND A JAPANESE FIRM IS SEEKING COPPER EXPLORATION CONCESSIONS. A PROPOSAL FOR AN AUTO ASSEMBLY PLANT HAS BOGGED DOWN, BUT MAY BE REVIVED IF AN EXPORT MARKET FOR CARS CAN BE FOUND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. IN MANY OF THESE PROJECTS THE JAPANESE ARE IN COMPETITION WITH EUROPEAN AND OTHER FIRMS WHICH ARE MAKING SIMILAR OFFERS. THE INTENTION IS CLEARLY TO ATTEMPT TO ASSURE FUTURE SAUDI EXPORTS OF OIL TO JAPAN, ALTHOUGH THAT  
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LINKAGE HAS NOT BEEN AND MAY NOT BE INCORPORATED IN A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT.

#### 6. PROGRESS ON YAKUTSK GAS PROJECT IN SIBERIA.

TOKYO GAS CHAIRMAN ANZAI VISITED MOSCOW AND MET WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ON JANUARY 31 TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED INVESTMENT BY HIS COMPANY AND EL PASO GAS IN THE NATURAL GAS PROJECT NEAR YAKUTSK. THE THREE SIDES ARE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON PLANS FOR THE EXPLORATION PHASE AT A COST OF ABOUT \$200 MILLION IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD BE LOANED TO THE USSR ON A "NO RISK" BASIS. HOWEVER, THE US EX-IM BANK HAS NOT APPROVED THE CREDIT OR ISSUED A

PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT, AND MAY NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO AS LONG AS THE VANEK AMENDMENT TO THE TRADE REFORM ACT IS PENDING. THAT AMENDMENT WOULD PROHIBIT EX-IM CREDITS TO THE USSR AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS RESTRICT JEWISH EMIGRATION. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE EX-IM BANK IS RELUCTANT TO APPROVE ANY NEW CREDITS TO THE USSR.

7. EMERGENCY MEASURES IN KOREA.

THE ROKG HANDED DOWN DRACONIAN SENTENCES LAST WEEK TO SIX PERSONS CONVICTED OF VIOLATING THE EMERGENCY MEASURES DECREES OF JANUARY 8. CHANG CHUNG HA, AUTHOR OF THE PETITION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION AND ASSOCIATE OF PAK KI WAN, RECEIVED THE MAXIMUM 15 YEARS AT HARD LABOR. BOTH HAD DELIBERATELY PROVOKED GOVERNMENT ACTION. SEVEN YONSEI UNIVERSITY STUDENTS WERE SENTENCED, TWO TO TEN YEARS, THREE TO SEVEN YEARS, AND TWO TO FIVE YEARS. THE SEVERITY OF THESE SENTENCES, THE FIRST UNDER THE EMERGENCY MEASURES, IS A CLEAR WARNING AGAINST FURTHER PROTESTS.

8. CHINESE PROTEST ROK-JAPAN CONTINENTAL SHELF AGREEMENT.

THERE WAS REACTION FROM PEKING, TAIPEI, AND PYONGYANG TO THE ROK-JAPAN AGREEMENT ON EXPLORATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF SOUTH OF KOREA. PYONGYANG CHARGED IN A MOFA STATEMENT THAT PARK HAD NO RIGHT TO BARTER AWAY RESOURCES BELONGING TO THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE AND DECLARED THE AGREEMENT NULL AND VOID. THE ROC MOFA  
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INFORMALLY COMMENTED TO VISITING ROK ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE AGREED JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE INCLUDED AREAS "UNDER ROC CONTROL". THE PRC MOFA ISSUED A STATEMENT DESCRIBING THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT CHINESE PARTICIPATION AS AN "INFRINGEMENT ON CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY". THE ROK MOFA RESPONDED BY REAFFIRMING ITS WILLINGNESS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRC (USING THAT TITLE BUT DROPPING IT FROM DOMESTIC REPORTING) ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FULL TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT AND ARE NOW EXAMINING IT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF CONFLICTING CLAIMS.

9. CHIREP IN INTELSAT.

WITH EACH PASSING HOUR THE CHANCES OF AVOIDING A VOTE ON THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN INTELSAT IMPROVES. ON THE OPENING DAY OF THE FEBRUARY 4-8 MEETING, PAKISTAN PROPOSED AS A NEW AGENDA ITEM THE "RESTORATION OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS" OF THE PRC IN THE ORGANIZATION. THIS WORDING APPARENTLY CAUSED SOME RESENTMENT AMONG THE OTHER DELEGATIONS. ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, PAKISTAN

SUBSTITUTED THE MORE NEUTRAL WORDING OF "CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN INTELSTAT".

10. IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PROCEDURES, THE CHAIRMAN, WHO WAS ALSO HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, TENTATIVELY CONCLUDED THAT THE ITEM SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE AGENDA ONLY IF THERE WAS NO OBJECTION. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, APPROXIMATELY 15 COUNTRIES INCLUDING FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND ITALY ARGUED THAT PAKISTAN HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE MATTER WAS "URGENT" AND, THEREFORE, THEY OPPOSED INCLUSION OF THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE ON THE AGENDA. SENSING DEFEAT, THE PAKISTAN DELEGATION TEMPORARILY WITHDREW THEIR PROPOSAL.

11. WITH ONLY A DAY AND A HALF LEFT IN THE SESSION (AS OF NOON, FEBRUARY 7), TIME BECOMES ALL IMPORTANT. PAKISTAN MAY CHALLENGE THE REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE WHICH ACCEPTED THE ROC CREDENTIALS, BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT CHALLENGE WILL FAIL. THERE WILL  
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THEN BE A LENGTHY DEBATE ON THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, WITH PAKISTAN ATTEMPTING TO ELIMINATE THE SECRET BALLOT. FOLLOWING THAT, THERE WILL BE DEBATE AGAIN AND A VOTE ON WHETHER THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE IS IN FACT AN URGENT MATTER. ONLY THEN COULD A RESOLUTION ON THE REPRESENTATION ISSUE BE DISCUSSED. IF THIS STAGE IS NOT REACHED UNTIL MID-DAY OR LATER ON FEBRUARY 8, IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE DELEGATIONS WILL PREFER TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION UNTIL THE NEXT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES MEETING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 1976.

12. THE PARACELS - SPRATLY PROBLEM

LATE LAST WEEK "GOVERNMENT SOURCES" IN TAIPEI TOLD UPI THAT THE ROC "WILL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES RENOUNCE TERRITORIAL CLAIM OVER THE SPRATLYS AND WOULD MAINTAIN GARRISON FORCES ON MAJOR ISLETS OF THE CHAIN." BUT THE SAME SOURCES ADDED THE ROC WILL "TRY ITS VERY BEST TO AVOID ANY MILITARY ENGAGEMENT" WITH RVN FORCES IN THE AREA. THE TERRITORIAL CLAIM ECHOES THE OFFICIAL MOFA STATEMENT OF JANUARY 18.

13. COMMENT: THE ROC REMAINS IN AN UNHAPPY POSITION. THEY CANNOT WEAKEN THEIR TERRITORIAL CLAIM TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLETS BUT, IN ASSERTING IT, THEY RISK DAMAGING IMPORTANT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH TWO OF THEIR STRONGEST SUPPORTERS, SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE PHILIPPINES. MILITARILY, TO AVOID LOSING FACE AT HOME, THEY COULD CONCEIVABLY FEEL COMPELLED TO FIGHT, HOWEVER BRIEFLY, SHOULD THEIR GARRISONS ON T'AI-P'ING (ITU ABA IN THE SPRATLYS)

AND PRATAS REEF BE CHALLENGED. THIS, IN TURN, COULD CAUSE THE TACIT ROC-PRC AGREEMENT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH EACH OTHER'S FORCES TO BREAK DOWN.

14. THE GOP HAS MADE A CAREFUL AND DELIBERATE ADVANCE OF ITS CLAIMS TO THE NORTHEAST PORTION OF WHAT IS GENERALLY CALLED THE SPRATLY ISLAND GROUP. THE PHILIPPINE POSITION, STATED IN LARGELY PARALLEL NOTES TO THE GVN AND ROC EMBASSIES, AS NOW DRAFTED AND PUBLICIZED IS A MUCH FIRMER AND MORE DEFINITE EXPRESSION OF A CLAIM IN THE DISPUTED  
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AREA THAN WAS ADVANCED IN 1971.

15. THE NOTES DESCRIBE THE PHILIPPINE CLAIM AS KALAYAAN (FREEDOMLAND IN TAGALOG), NAME FIVE ISLANDS AS OCCUPIED BY THE PHILIPPINES, DECLARE THAT THIS ISLAND GROUP IS FAR REMOVED FROM THE SPRATLYS PROPER, AND CONTRAST ITS PROXIMITY (250 MILES) TO PHILIPPINE TERRITORY WITH THE GREATER DISTANCES TO VIETNAM (350 MILES) AND TAIWAN (960 MILES). THE NOTES ALSO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF GVN AND ROC MILITARY FORCES IN THE KALAYAAN AREA, AND URGE DISCUSSION IN THE UN OR AMONG THE WORLD WAR II ALLIES TO RESOLVE THE TERRITORIAL CONTROVERSY.

16. FOREIGN SECRETARY ROMULO AND DEFENSE SECRETARY ENRILE IN SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE ECHOED THE CALL FOR AN AMICABLE RESOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, WITH ENRILE ADDING THAT WHILE A PRC MOVE INTO THE SPRATLYS WAS POSSIBLE, "...THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE....THEY WILL NOT JUST RAM THEIR WAY THROUGH." EMBASSY MANILA COMMENTS THAT

THE GOP IS PREPARING FOR A LONG HAUL WHILE KEEPING ITS FINGERS CROSSED THAT THE PRC WILL NOT MOVE IN AND PREMATURELY END THE DEBATE.

17. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO REINFORCE THE GVN CLAIM TO THE SPRATLY ISLANDS, VIETNAMESE NAVAL FORCES HAVE LANDED ON A SIXTH ISLAND IN THE ARCHIPELAGO. THE THREE-SHIP GVN FLOTILLA NOW OPERATING IN THE SPRATLYS IS UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO LAND ONLY ON UNOCCUPIED ISLANDS AND NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANY HOSTILE ACTION TOWARD FOREIGN FORCES IN THE AREA. THE PRC REACTION TO THE DISPATCH OF ADDITIONAL GVN FORCES TO THE AREA WAS SHARP, WARNING THAT THE NEW GVN MOVE CONSTITUTES "A WANTON INFRINGEMENT ON CHINA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY". A FEBRUARY 4 PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT WARNS THAT CHINA "WILL NOT TOLERATE INFRINGEMENT ON CHINA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" BUT STOPS SHORT OF THREATENING IMMINENT ACTION. THE USLO PEKING VIEW IS THAT IF THE GVN CONTINUES TO PUBLICIZE ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA, THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN PEKING MAY WELL BRING ANOTHER FORCEFUL CHINESE RESPONSE. THE SAIGON PRESS

CONTINUES TO GIVE WIDE COVERAGE TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

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ISLANDS, SPECULATING ESPECIALLY ABOUT AN RVN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ROC AND/OR THE PHILIPPINES, TWO OTHER CLAIMANTS TO THE SPRATLYS.

18. MEANWHILE AMBASSADOR PHUONG CALLED ON DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH FEBRUARY 5 TO EXPRESS THE GVN'S CONCERN, PARTICULARLY OVER A POSSIBLE PRC MILITARY MOVE INTO THE SPRATLYS. PHUONG SAID THE GVN WOULD STAND FIRM ON THE SPRATLYS AND WOULD NOT MOVE UNLESS THE PRC REACTED WITH FORCE. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REITERATED OUR POSITION AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY POWER TO EFFECT TERRITORIAL CHANGE. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THE PRC WOULD HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO LOSE AND LITTLE TO GAIN BY GOING INTO THE SPRATLYS.

19. SUHARTO TIGHTENS CONTROLS AS RUMORS OF SPLIT GROW

THE THIRD WEEK SINCE THE JAKARTA RIOTS WAS MARKED BY AN INCREASING VOLUME OF RUMORS ABOUT POWER SHIFTS AT THE TOP LEVELS OF THE SUHARTO REGIME. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED TO BE TIGHTENING HIS GRIP ON THE STATE SECURITY MACHINERY, FOLLOWING HIS DECISION TO TAKE COMMAND OF KOPKAMTIB FROM GENERAL SUMITRO, AND SOME REPORTS SUGGEST THAT SUMITRO'S KEY LIEUTENANTS IN THE REGIONS MAY BE REMOVED IN THE NEXT MONTH. WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO ABOLISH THE POST OF ASPRI WAS A COSMETIC MOVE, ANSWERING CRITICS BUT LEAVING EX-ASPRIS MURTOPO AND SUDJONO HUMARDANI

IN POSITIONS OF CONTINUING INFLUENCE, OR AN AUTHENTIC HOUSECLEANING MEASURE, IS FAR FROM CLEAR. INDICATIVE OF THE LEVEL OF TENSION WAS THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S PUBLIC DENIAL THAT GENERALS SUMITRO, NASUTION AND DJATIKUSUMO HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

20. AT A FAREWELL DINNER FOR AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, DEFENSE MINISTER PANGGABEAN CONFIDED THAT THE SITUATION IN WEST JAVA AND JAKARTA IS "VERY EXPLOSIVE". HE SKETCHED OUT A CONFUSED PLOT INVOLVING STUDENTS, SOCIALISTS, MUSLIMS, COMMUNISTS, AND SOME UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES, NOTABLY THE BRAWIDJAJA AND SILIWANGI DIVISIONS (EAST AND WEST JAVA). HE WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF EX-ASPRIS MURTOPO AND SUDJONO BUT  
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HIS HEAVIEST SUSPICION FELL ON THE MUSLIMS (HE IS A CHRISTIAN) AND THE COMMUNISTS.

21. NEVER BRILLIANT BUT PERHAPS THE MOST LOYAL OF SUHARTO'S

LIEUTENANTS, PANGGABEAN SEEMED SOMEWHAT OVERWROUGHT AND PREPARED TO ACCEPT A MYRIAD-DEVILS THEORY. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT HIS REMARKS MAY PORTEND A WIDE-RANGING CAMPAIGN OF ARRESTS AND REPRESSION RATHER THAN CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS TO ALLEVIATE SOCIAL TENSION AND REPAIR THE SPLIT IN MILITARY UNITY. THE AMBASSADOR HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT "DICTATORSHIP TEMPERED BY INEFFICIENCY", TRADITIONAL IN INDONESIA, MIGHT SOON GIVE WAY TO SOMETHING MORE AUTHORITARIAN. A FURTHER IMPRESSION THE AMBASSADOR GAINED FROM GENERAL PANGGABEAN WAS THAT SUHARTO IS NOW FULLY IN COMMAND OF

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